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Light Tactical Vehicle Background
Over the past 20 years, the purpose and use of the Army's tactical wheeled vehicles have dramatically changed. Originally designed as a thin-skinned vehicle, deployed primarily in a logistics centric role, behind what was once considered the forward line of troops on a linear battlefield, is now an armored vehicle, required to 2 survive in an ever-increasing threat environment in both a logistics and weaponscarrying platform role. Significant leaps in technology and protection have greatly increased the cost of the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. In the case of the HMMWV, the AUMC increased from an initial cost of $70,000 for the base vehicle at its highest point to over $220,000 fully loaded with armor kits. 2 The HMMWV, and later, the Mine- 
System Description
The JLTV Family of Vehicles (FoV) consists of two armor protected variants. The first is a two-seat variant and the second variant is a four seat vehicle, as seen in Figure 1 below. The two-seat variant has but one base vehicle platform which is Utility. It may be configured to carry small quantities of cargo, a mounted shelter, or even serve as a prime mover for towed howitzers. The four-seat variant, however, has two base vehicle platforms. The first is a General Purpose (GP) vehicle and the second is a Close
Combat Weapons Carrier (CCWC).
The four-seat base vehicle platforms are further decomposed to specific mission package (MP) configurations. The GP vehicle may be used as a four seat utility vehicle, and may also be configured as a Heavy Guns Carrier (HGC 
Requirements
It is important to discuss requirements when trying to identify challenges in a program.
In all instances, requirements translate directly to cost. It is difficult to defend a program where the cost drivers/requirements are continuously changing and are perceived as Weight range referred to the amount to vehicle could weigh fully burdened with mission package equipment. The weight range started with a maximum weight of 30,000 pounds and was reduced to a maximum 21,000 pounds over time and across the other three requirements documents.
The next requirement is reliability. It is measured in Mean Miles Between
Operational Mission Failure (MMBOMF). The ICD began with 11,700 MMBOMF and over time was reduced to only 2400.
The final requirement was cost, defined as the average unit manufacturing costs (AUMC). The initial AUMC was $200,000. Research indicated that the initial cost was well below the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) and Joint Cost Estimate (JCE). Over time, the AUMC was reduced from a high point of $400,000 to its current cost of $250,000.
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Issues
The JLTV program was being subjected to a level of scrutiny commensurate with a program that had a history of issues which almost resulted in program termination.
The JLTV program suffered from unstable requirements, an increase in predicted manufacturing cost early in the TD phase. These issues had not yet been fully rectified before the successful completion of the TD phase. They were publically identified by the DAE, John Young, at the beginning of the TD phase, and by the Senate Appropriations Committee just after the successful completion of the TD phase. In both instances, immediate and responsible action was taken to resolve the conflict and preceded with the execution of the program. 29 JPO JLTV utilized Better Buying Power tenets in the execution of the program.
The program sought mature technology with low technical complexity. Requirements were prioritized into tradable tiers, with the highest tier being the list of threshold vehicle key performance parameters which could not be traded. Requirements were tiered so that vendors could make intelligent trade decisions based on stable requirements, a production price that was set in a robust competitive environment, and a firm fixed price contract vehicle. 30 John Young was not convinced that by the end of the TD phase, his concerns over the potential lack of maturity of technology, unstable requirements and funding inadequacy had been satisfied. His concerns were not strictly related to the JLTV program. They were the manifestation of many major programs being initiated without truly understanding the technical risk involved, a full appreciation for stable requirements and an adequate way to estimate development and procurement costs. Materiel Developer requirements refinement and cost management effort
• Strong industry participation RMAP is a proven process that introduces deliberate systems engineering rigor and provides for a structured review of technical data and analysis during the TD phase.
It also allows Combat Developers to make informed decisions regarding requirements and a high potential for driving down costs.
The Cost-Informed Trades Analysis (CITA) is a proven process that establishes trade-space between capabilities and cost. It allows the PM to consider and implement lower-cost options to satisfy requirements and achieve cost targets.
Strong industry participation in the competitive process allows industry partners to gain tremendous insight, make responsible and informed trade decisions, remain competitive, and provide the best possible prices to the government.
Recommendation
The Department of Defense should strongly consider institutionalizing both the Requirement Management and Analysis Plan (RMAP) and the Cost-Informed Trades Analysis (CITA) processes. Further, the JLTV program has proved that using mature technology with low technical complexity, prioritizing requirements into tradable tiers,
